

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 061688

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, UR, US

SUBJECT: US-USSR CONSULTATIONS ON CW LIMITATIONS, ROUND
TWO

REFS: (A) STATE 038259; (B) STATE 050520; (C) MOSCOW 3162

THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR ROUND TWO
OF US-USSR CONSULTATIONS ON CW LIMITATIONS:

1. OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE PRESENT TALKS ARE:

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(A) TO EXPLORE TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO POSSIBLE CW
LIMITATIONS AND TO IDENTIFY ANY AREAS OF AGREEMENT ON
THESE MATTERS;

(B) TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING US COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL
OF EFFECTIVE CW LIMITATIONS AND US WILLINGNESS TO WORK
ACTIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARD SOLUTION OF REMAINING

PROBLEMS;

(C) TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT A COMMON APPROACH CANNOT BE EXPECTED ON THE BASIS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION TABLED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES AT THE CCD IN MARCH 1972 (CCD/361) OR OF THE DRAFT SOVIET CONVENTION GIVEN US PRIVATELY IN AUGUST 1974; AND TO EMPHASIZE IN-

STEAD OUR VIEWS ON AGENT DEFINITION AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

2. BASIC SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE FOR CONSULTATIONS IS CONTAINED IN THE APRIL 13, 1976, SPEECH BY US CCD REP. IN ADDITION, THE DELEGATION MAY DRAW ON OTHER INTERAGENCY APPROVED DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WORKING PAPERS TABLED BY THE US AT THE CCD;

(B) COMMENTS ON UK DRAFT CW TREATY (STATE 160354, STATE 175936; CLEARED SPEECH ON UK DRAFT).

(C) GUIDANCE CABLE FOR SUMMER 1976 SESSION (STATE 152576) AND SPRING 1977 CCD SESSION (STATE 32307).

(D) CABLES DEALING WITH US-SOVIET CONTACTS AND PREVIOUS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS;

(E) APRIL 8, 1976, GUIDANCE ON CW (STATE 085198);

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3. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO INITIATE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AND TECHNICAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY EXPLORED AND THAT IT IS NOT AUTHORIZED AT PRESENT TIME TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATION OF JOINT INITIATIVE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT NO EFFECTIVE MEASURES CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THE CCD UNLESS THE US AND SOVIET UNION AGREE UPON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR CW LIMITATIONS.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE DELEGATION SHOULD REITERATE THE US VIEW THAT, TO BE EFFECTIVE, ANY APPROACH TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS LIMITATIONS MUST BE A BALANCED ONE. IT MUST PROVIDE SATISFACTORY ASSURANCE TO A STATE THAT IT IS NOT INCREASING THE RISK TO ITS NATIONAL SECURITY IN BECOMING A PARTY AND MUST NOT PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANOTHER STATE TO GAIN A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE LATTER COULD HAPPEN IF THE EFFECT OF THE TREATY'S SCOPE WERE TO REQUIRE ONE STATE TO DESTROY ITS ENTIRE CW STOCKPILE BUT

TO ALLOW ANOTHER STATE TO RETAIN MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STOCKS.

5. AS PART OF EFFORT TO ACHIEVE SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK ON CW, THE DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK SOVIET SUPPORT FOR US VIEWS ON QUESTIONS OF DEFINITION OF CW AGENTS, TYPES OF AGENTS COVERED, AND VERIFICATION PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE EXPLORED.

6. THE DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK SOVIET REACTIONS TO PRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE US PRIVATELY (TO SOVIETS) AND AT THE CCD, ESPECIALLY THEIR VIEWS ON EFFECTIVE WAYS OF SOLVING VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND ON UTILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF TECHNICAL EXCHANGE VISITS. (FYI: DEL SHOULD KEEP IN MIND NEED TO WORK OUT DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISITS IN THE EVENT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE IS EVENTUALLY ACHIEVED. END FYI.) DEL SHOULD SEEK CONFIDENTIAL

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CLARIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON CW VERIFICATION CONTAINED IN SOVIET MEMORANDUM PRESENTED AT UNGA IN FALL 1976.

7. IF SOVIETS RAISE THEIR 1972 OR 1974 DRAFTS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD POINT OUT THE KEY SHORTCOMINGS OF THOSE PROPOSALS. IN PARTICULAR, THE DRAFTS FAIL TO PROVIDE ANY EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL OR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES OR ADEQUATE DEFINITIONS OF AGENTS SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS.

8. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT, AS IN PAST ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS BW CONVENTION AND ENMOD CONVENTION, A CW AGREEMENT WOULD COVER NOT ONLY EXISTING TYPES OF CW AGENTS AND WEAPONS, BUT ANY NEW TYPES THAT MIGHT BECOME FEASIBLE IN THE FUTURE. SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THIS GENERAL POINT SHOULD BE SOUGHT.

9. WITH REGARD TO FORM OF POSSIBLE JOINT INITIATIVE DEL SHOULD STATE THAT US STRONGLY PREFERS JOINT INITIATIVE IN FORM OF KEY ELEMENTS (OR PRINCIPLES) FOR A CW AGREEMENT RATHER THAN A JOINT TREATY DRAFT. WE BELIEVE THAT LIST OF AGREED KEY ELEMENTS WOULD BE MUCH LESS CUMBERSOME TO WORK OUT, AND JUDGING FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY WITH ENMOD CONVENTION, IS LIKELY TO HAVE MUCH BETTER RECEPTION IN CCD. US PROPOSES THEREFORE THAT TWO SIDES ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT SUCH A LIST OF KEY ELEMENTS AT A FUTURE TIME ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

10. IF SOVIETS PROPOSE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS DEL MAY TENTATIVELY AGREE TO HOLD THIRD ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS

BUT SHOULD POINT OUT THAT TIMING WILL DEPEND COMPLETION
OF OUR REVIEW.

11. ANY PUBLIC COMMUNIQUE REGARDING THE CONSULTATIONS
SHOULD RELATE THEM SPECIFICALLY TO THE JULY 1974
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SUMMIT STATEMENT AND SHOULD AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT
DRAFTING OF A TREATY TEXT IS UNDERWAY.

12. WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC TECHNICAL ISSUES:

(A) AT FIRST ROUND IT WAS AGREED THAT INHALATION AND
INTRAVENOUS ROUTES OF ADMINISTRATION COULD BE USED FOR
TOXICITY STANDARDS. DEL MAY AGREE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL TO
INCLUDE ORAL ROUTE AS WELL. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE
PERCUTANEOUS ROUTE TO BE USEFUL ONE SINCE MEASUREMENTS
CAN BE MADE MORE EASILY OTHER WAYS, LARGE BODY OF
TOXICITY DATA DOES NOT EXIST FOR THIS ROUTE, AND
TOXICITY LIKELY TO BE GREATER BY ONE OF THREE OTHER
ROUTES.

(B) PREVIOUSLY US SUGGESTED ESTABLISHMENT OF SYSTEM OF
DEFINITIONS BASED ON TWO TOXICITY THRESHOLDS - ONE
THRESHOLD WOULD SEPARATE SUPER-TOXIC COMPOUNDS FROM LESS
TOXIC BUT POTENTIALLY LETHAL COMPOUNDS. THE OTHER
THRESHOLD WOULD SEPARATE THE LATTER CATEGORY FROM THE
COMPOUNDS WHICH HAVE LITTLE IF ANY, MILITARY POTENTIAL
AS LETHAL CW AGENTS. DEL SHOULD POINT THAT EVEN GROUP
OF COMPOUNDS WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE MILITARY POTENTIAL
WOULD BE COVERED BY GENERAL-PURPOSE CRITERION.
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